The Claims of Animals and the Needs of Strangers: Two Cases of Imperfect Right by Korsgaard, Christine M.
Volume 6, Issue 1
The Claims Of Animals And The Needs Of Strangers 19
The Claims of Animals and the Needs of 




This paper argues for a conception of the natural rights of non-human animals 
grounded in Kant’s explanation of the foundation of human rights. The rights in 
question are rights that are in the first instance held against humanity collectively 
speaking—against our species conceived as an organized body capable of collective 
action. The argument proceeds by first developing a similar case for the right of every 
human individual who is in need of aid to get it, and then showing why the situation 
of animals is similar. 
I first review some of the reasons why people are resistant to the idea that animals 
might have rights. I then explain Kant’s conception of natural rights. I challenge the 
idea that duties of aid and duties of kindness to animals fit the traditional category of 
“imperfect duties” and argue that they are instead cases of “imperfect right.” I explain 
how you can hold a right against a group, and why it is legitimate to conceive of hu-
manity as such a group. I then argue that Kant’s account of the foundation of prop-
erty rights is grounded in a conception of the common possession of the Earth that 
grounds a right to aid and the rights of animals to be treated in ways that are consis-
tent with their good. Finally, I return to the objections to the idea that animals have 
rights and offer some responses to them.
KEYWORDS: animals, duties of aid, humanity, Immanuel Kant, perfect and 
imperfect duties, rights.
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1. THE QUESTION OF ANIMAL RIGHTS
Some people use the term “animal rights” to refer simply to the moral claims of 
non-human animals, whatever those might be. In this paper I use the term “rights” in 
its more specific sense, to designate a particular kind of moral claim. Roughly speak-
ing, a “right” is a claim that may be, and ought to be, legally enforced. The enforce-
ment of rights can be claimed as a matter of law and justice: it is not merely a matter 
of charity. 
Most people think that non-human animals (hereinafter “animals”) have what 
philosophers call “moral standing.” That is, they believe that animals are the appro-
priate objects of moral concern, and they think that we have moral duties to treat 
animals in certain ways that are good for them for the sake of the animals them-
selves, and not just, say, for the sake of their owners or of keeping them profitable. 
Admittedly, many people think that these duties are of a rather weak kind: they think 
we ought to treat animals “as humanely as possible” given the ways that we use them. 
For example, according to some animal welfare laws, animals used in scientific re-
search in ways that might be painful to them must be given anesthetics if it does not 
interfere with the purpose of the research. The duty to spare the animal pain is not 
taken to be a reason against doing the research. But most people admit at least a duty 
to prevent animals from experiencing “unnecessary” pain. 
Most people also think that at least some of our duties to animals should be 
enforced by legal sanctions. That is why there are animal welfare protection laws on 
the books. Yet, for reasons I will describe below, many people think it is absurd to 
suppose that animals either do or should have rights, in the specific sense of rights I 
am concerned with here. This combination of views may look contradictory on the 
surface, but in fact, animal welfare laws do not usually grant the animals themselves 
any rights, at least if we think of a right as something that the right-holder can claim. 
For example, at least in the United States as things stand now, the legal representa-
tives of animals cannot sue for the enforcement of animal welfare laws in the name of 
the animals themselves. Only human beings who can claim to have some interest of 
their own in the enforcement of animal welfare laws can sue to have them enforced 
(Sunstein 2004).
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In this paper I argue that animals do have rights, but that these rights have a 
distinctive structure. I say that animals “do have rights” rather than merely that they 
“should have rights,” because the argument I will give is based on Immanuel Kant’s 
conception of rights, and is therefore in the natural rights tradition, according to 
which rights are grounded in morality, and can in a sense exist prior to, or indepen-
dently of, any positive laws that are actually on the books. I will discuss the idea of 
a natural right further in section three. The distinctive structure of animals’ rights 
is this: Many of our rights are held against individuals, at least in the first instance: 
either against every individual in a group, as one’s civil rights are, or against some spe-
cific individuals, as when two people are bound by a contract or a promise. Animals, 
I argue, have rights that are in the first instance rights against humanity collectively 
speaking, humanity as a group, to be treated by people in ways that are consistent 
with what is good for them. The corresponding duties of individuals are derived 
from the duties we have collectively. I believe that as individuals we also have duties 
to treat animals well, and in particular to avoid cruelty. But I think that the duties 
of humanity collectively speaking are in a distinctive way the ground of rights that 
ought to have legal force.
I will try to demonstrate that there are such rights—rights against humanity col-
lectively—by arguing for another important case of this kind of right. I believe that 
every human being who is in need of aid in order to survive in a reasonable condi-
tion has a right with exactly this structure—a right against humanity, collectively, to 
ensure the provision of that aid. Both that particular human right and animal rights 
are traceable to the same fact, namely the fact that humanity, collectively speaking, is 
in a position to exercise extensive control over the fate of all of the inhabitants of the 
planet with whom we interact. 
2. OBJECTIONS TO THE IDEA OF ANIMAL RIGHTS
In this section, I sketch some of the reasons why people are resistant to the 
idea that animals either do or should have rights. After I have offered my account of 
why animals have rights I will return to these objections and discuss how we might 
respond to them. 
2.1. Animals are property, and property cannot have rights.
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Following the tradition of Roman law, legal systems generally divide the world 
into persons and property, treating human beings as persons, and pretty much ev-
erything else, including non-human animals, as property. Persons are the subjects 
of both rights and obligations, including the right to own property, while objects 
of property, being by their very nature for the use of persons, have no rights at all. 
Animals, of course, are traditionally classified as property—domestic animals as the 
property of individuals or organizations, and wild animals as the property of the state. 
For obvious reasons, there can seem to be a kind of incoherence in granting rights to 
property, especially rights against the owners of the property. For this reason, some 
animal rights advocates have proposed that animals, or that animals with a certain 
degree of cognitive sophistication—primates and cetaceans perhaps—should be re-
classified as legal persons. 
To anticipate, the view I advocate in this paper does not call for this kind of re-
classification. I think we should reject the legal bifurcation instead, and acknowledge 
the existence of a third legally relevant category, whose members can have some kinds 
of rights. Though I do not have space to discuss the issue in depth here, I want to 
mention one reason why I think this matters. Although people use the term “person” 
in different ways, I think that we can identify one fairly widely accepted concept of a 
person that is morally and legally important, and that non-human animals do not fit 
that concept. Speaking roughly, the concept of a person is the concept of a norma-
tively self-governing being. By that I mean a being who is able to govern her choice of 
ends and actions by applying standards of rightness and wrongness, and/or of good-
ness and badness. Only human beings and certain organizations, such as political 
states, fit that concept.1 As the ideas I will discuss in connection with the third ob-
jection suggest, many of many of our most important rights—those associated with 
autonomy—spring from the fact that we are persons in this sense. Animals do not 
share in these rights, so reclassifying animals as persons blurs a distinction that we 
have good moral and legal reasons to make.
2.2. Rights require a kind of reciprocity of which animals are incapable.
Many people think of the realm of rights as being in some distinctive way a realm 
of reciprocity. Rights are something we accord reciprocally to each other. To say you 
1.  For further discussion see Korsgaard 2018, Section 3.2.3. 
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have a right implies that you also have obligations, in particular obligations to respect 
the rights of others.
It can be hard to pin this thought down in exactly the right way. For instance, 
we might be tempted to think of it as something like a bargain based on mutual self-
interest—I will keep my hands off of your property or your liberties if you will keep 
your hands off of mine. David Hume argued that animals do not have rights with 
something like this conception of reciprocity in mind. Hume makes the argument 
in order to prove that the duties of justice are grounded in considerations of self-
interest and utility. We expect people to conform to the duties of justice only under 
certain conditions, Hume argues, and those conditions are exactly the ones in which 
conforming to the duties of justice is useful to all concerned. One of these conditions 
is an approximate equality of power between the parties to the agreement, which 
renders it in the interest of all parties to make and maintain the agreement. If you had 
enough power to completely control someone else, it would not be in your interest 
to make any concessions to him, and Hume thinks you therefore would not owe him 
anything. On these grounds, Hume argues that we do not have duties of justice to the 
other animals:
Were there a species of creatures intermingled with men, which, though rational, 
were possessed of such inferior strength, both of body and mind, that they were in-
capable of all resistance, and could never, upon the highest provocation, make us 
feel the effects of their resentment; the necessary consequence, I think, is that we 
should be bound by the laws of humanity to give gentle usage to these creatures, 
but should not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with regard to 
them, nor could they possess any right or property, exclusive of such arbitrary lords. 
Our intercourse with them could not be called society, which supposes a degree of 
equality; but absolute command on the one side, and servile obedience on the other. 
Whatever we covet, they must instantly resign: Our permission is the only tenure, 
by which they hold their possessions: Our compassion and kindness the only check, 
by which they curb our lawless will: And as no inconvenience ever results from 
the exercise of a power, so firmly established in nature, the restraints of justice and 
property, being totally useless, would never have place in so unequal a confederacy.
This is plainly the situation of men, with regard to animals; and how far these may 
be said to possess reason, I leave it to others to determine (Hume 1975, pp. 190-91).
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But bargains based on self-interest are subject to the free-rider problem: you lose 
your reason to comply with them when it is in your interest to renege. So this kind of 
reciprocity cannot ground any strong commitment to upholding the rights of others. 
Later I will propose a conception of reciprocity that I think is more to the 
purpose. But however exactly we understand the nature of the reciprocity involved, 
we are inclined to view it as essential to rights. Having rights goes along with having 
responsibilities or obligations; you cannot have one without the other. But non-hu-
man animals are not moral beings, and therefore we might suppose they cannot have 
moral or legal obligations. So we might conclude that they cannot have rights.
2.3 The function of rights is to protect auton-
omy, and animals are not autonomous. 
A third and related problem, for some thinkers, is that they believe that the 
special point of rights, as opposed to other kinds of moral claims, is to secure the 
liberty and autonomy of those who hold the rights. This is particularly true of think-
ers in the natural rights tradition, and of those who uphold the “will theory” rather 
than the “interest theory” of rights. The interest theory of rights holds that rights 
exist to protect an individual’s important interests; while the will theory holds that 
rights define a sphere over which an individual has normative control. That sphere 
consists of those actions she is free to do if she chooses, and the objects of property 
she may use as she likes. The control is “normative” because others count as wrong-
ing her if they interfere with her actions or use her property without her permission. 
Immanuel Kant, who represents the natural rights tradition, thought of rights as co-
ercively enforceable prescriptions that are essential to maintaining the (equal) liberty 
of everyone. The use of force or coercion against free rational beings, he argued, is 
wrong, except when you are using force to protect someone’s freedom—to hinder 
a hindrance to freedom, as he put it (Kant 1996, 6:231).2 So we may use force or co-
ercion—that is, we may use the power of law—in order to protect equal liberty, but 
not to promote other ends. John Rawls, to take another example, thought of rights 
in a liberal society as aimed at securing to each citizen, as far as possible, the ability 
to pursue her own conception of the good—that is, her own conception of what is 
worth doing and caring about in a human life (Rawls 1971). According to such views, 
2.  References to Kant will be given in the usual way by the page numbers of the relevant volume of 
Kants gesammelte Schriften, which appear in the margins of most translations.
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rights ensure that we are not bound by restrictions grounded merely in other people’s 
ideas about what is worth doing and caring about. We are bound only by restrictions 
that spring from the requirement that everyone’s liberty or autonomous pursuit of 
her own conception of the good should be equally protected.
But there is no point in trying to secure political liberty or autonomy in this 
sense to the other animals. They live according to their natures, not according to 
their values or their free choices or their personal conceptions of what is good. Nor 
is there much to be said for granting them what might seem the nearest analog to 
that kind of liberty—freedom of action in the simplest sense, allowing them to go 
where they please and do what they want. When animals, either wild or domestic, 
live within the confines of human society, it is essential both for their safety and ours 
that they live under a certain degree of human control. So on this showing rights do 
not seem to be the sort of thing we could intelligibly grant to animals. Rights protect 
a kind of liberty that the other animals do not and could not possibly have.
2.4. The idea that animals have rights has counter-
intuitive implications about the actions of our ances-
tors and those now living in the developing world.
There are also worries, perhaps of a more vague kind, about the implications 
of the idea that animals have rights for humanity’s past relations with animals, and, 
for similar reasons, for livestock farmers in the developing world now. It is natural 
to think that our duties of beneficence or kindness—duties that we do not usually 
think of as grounded in rights—are relative to our own resources and necessities. We 
cannot be required to give more than we can afford. That implies that these duties 
can change with changing conditions. When we think of our duties to animals as 
mere duties of kindness or humanity, we can say things that sound sensible about the 
actions of our ancestors. We no longer need to use real furs to keep from freezing, 
for example, because now we have indoor heating and artificial fabrics that work just 
as well. But our ancestors, especially in northern places, could hardly have refrained 
from wearing furs. We do not need to eat meat nowadays, when we can ship vegeta-
bles from wherever they are now growing to places where they are out of season, or 
keep them frozen until times of need. But this was not always true. We can now afford 
to be more humane than we once could; and we can make that change without any 
implied criticism of those who came before us. A similar point can be made about the 
Journal of Practical Ethics
 CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD26
impoverished owners of small holdings of livestock in the developing world. They 
cannot be expected just to give their livestock up. Kindness to animals is a luxury 
that they cannot afford.
But it is harder to think of a right as something that can be balanced against the 
costs to those who are supposed to respect it. Slave owners, most of us now think, 
were always wrong, regardless of cultural and economic conditions. No one has the 
right to treat another human being as property, and no one ever did. Our ancestors 
had to use furs, eat meat, hunt, and use animals for labor. That is how the human 
species evolved and came to live all over the planet—by using animals. So if animals 
have rights, were our ancestors simply wrong to do these things? If that seems coun-
terintuitive, doesn’t that show that even if animals have claims on our kindness, those 
claims do not spring from anything like animal rights?
2.5. The idea that animals have rights has out-
rageous practical implications.
Most importantly, however, the idea of animal rights seems worrisome because 
of its practical implications. Are all animals going to be accorded a basic right to life, 
and, if so, are meat-eating and hunting going to be outlawed? Would experiments 
on animals have to be brought to an end, or limited to those that do not harm the 
animals? And what about those of our own activities that inevitably hurt or kill 
animals, even when the purpose of those activities is benign? We kill mice and voles 
when we drive tractors through the fields on which we grow our vegetables. We kill 
and injure birds when we put up wind turbines—or for that matter, when we put up 
windows and power lines. Whenever we use pesticides, we kill not only their targets 
but other animals as well. Should all such activities be illegal, or legally regulated in 
some way?
These are controversial questions, and I think that under any reasonable con-
ception of animal rights, the answer to some of them will be “yes,” even if those im-
plications do seem outrageous to many people now. But the questions I have just 
raised lead naturally to further questions that begin to make the idea of animal rights 
seem not just controversial but silly. If animals have a right to life, for instance, might 
people be prosecuted for killing vermin that are infesting their homes or their food 
supplies or for swatting mosquitoes that are trying to bite them? And if animals have 
rights to life, or rights not to have suffering inflicted upon them, ought we to interfere 
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between predators and their prey, in the name of protecting the rights of prey animals 
to escape this form of suffering and death? And must we then find adequate meat 
substitutes for the predators? Or should we actually try to eliminate predator species 
altogether—if only we knew how—as Jeff McMahan suggested in a New York Times 
editorial a few years ago? (McMahan 2010).
There are obvious reasons, based on past experience, to worry about the human 
competence for tinkering with nature on this kind of scale. But even leaving those 
worries aside, many people find the idea of our managing nature in this way deeply 
distasteful, although the reasons are a little obscure. Some of us do not like the idea 
of living in a completely domesticated world. Some people feel that it is not part of 
humanity’s business to try moralize nature, or even that we do not have the right to. 
These worries give rise to some rather deep questions about what the human place 
in nature is, and how we should think about and respond to the amoral character of 
nature itself.
For all of these reasons, many people think that even if we have duties of kind-
ness and humanity to animals, these duties do not arise from any rights on the part of 
the animals themselves, and should not be the grounds for giving animals legal rights.
3. NATURAL RIGHTS, MORAL RIGHTS, 
AND PROVISIONAL RIGHTS
Before I challenge that claim, I need to clarify something about the conception 
of rights I am working with here. So far, most of what I have said has been ambigu-
ous between two claims: that animals should have rights and that they do have rights. 
There is a reason for this ambiguity, for there is a problem about what is going on 
when someone makes the case for a legal right.
Saying that I am arguing that animals “should have rights” has the disadvantage 
of making it sound as if all I am saying is that there is something to be said in favor of 
their having legal rights, some reasons that would support the policy of giving them 
rights. But that may not seem like the correct way to argue for a right, since a right 
ordinarily functions as a trump and a trump requires something stronger than some 
considerations in its favor. If I have a right to something, call it X, then you have no 
right to deprive me of X. My right is supposed to be a decisive consideration against 
your depriving me of X, however good your reasons for depriving me of X would be if 
I did not have the right. So to say that I have a right to X is not just to say that there 
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is a very strong reason for me to have X: it is to say something about the relations in 
which I stand to those against whom I claim the right. However good others’ reasons 
are for depriving me of X, they will be wronging me if they do so. That includes my re-
lations to society collectively speaking. But if my right is a trump even against society 
collectively speaking, how can society collectively speaking be in a position to grant 
me the right? When someone claims that she has a right, she is claiming precisely that 
no one is in a position to deny her that to which she has a right. But if no one is in a 
position to deny her the right, then it seems as if no one is in a position to grant her 
that to which she has the right either. What she is saying is precisely that this is not 
the sort of thing that others may withhold or to grant, however good their reasons. 
Consider, for instance, the idea that a nation might give its slaves a right to their 
freedom. Is another human being’s right to her freedom something that it is ours (all 
of us? the rest of us?) to give? How can society give someone his freedom, if it was 
already his own by right?
Some philosophers propose to deal with this problem by invoking the idea of a 
“moral right” and saying that moral rights are the grounds on which we should estab-
lish legal rights. That enables them to split the difference—the moral rights do already 
exist in the nature of things, even if the legal ones do not. Then we can say that what 
society does when it enacts laws protecting people’s rights is not granting them rights 
they did not already have, but protecting their moral rights by making them legal and 
so coercively enforceable.
That can sound sensible until we remind ourselves what exactly a right is. A 
right, at least according to Kant and others in the natural rights tradition, is—by def-
inition—a claim that may legitimately be coercively enforced. You have a right when 
you have a claim on others to act in a certain way and it is morally legitimate for you 
(or for society on your behalf) to defend yourself with the use of force against viola-
tions of that claim. Not all moral claims, we believe, may be coercively enforced. I 
cannot sue you for hurting my feelings or being rude to me or have you thrown into 
prison for breaking my heart, though you should not do these things. I cannot have 
you arrested if you fail to open a door for me when my arms are full of packages or to 
help me change a tire by the side of the road. How do we draw the distinction? Some 
philosophers would argue that the distinction should be drawn on pragmatic or con-
sequentialist grounds: on whether the costs of coercive enforcement are worth pre-
venting wrongs of this kind. Kant, however, believed that the distinction is based on 
principle. We have already seen what the principle in question is: we may coercively 
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enforce a claim only when we are “hindering a hindrance” to freedom. According 
to Kant, I am free when I can pursue my own ends and in doing so I am not subject 
to the wills of other people, that is, they may not legitimately just decide to interfere 
with my actions or prevent me from pursuing my ends. I am not made subject to your 
will when you try to break my heart, for I am perfectly free not to care. I am not made 
subject to your will when you fail to open a door for me, for that does not stop me 
from going through the door. But I am made subject to your will when you enslave me 
or make use of my person or my property without my consent. So my claims against 
these actions are coercively enforceable—that is, they are rights.
This account of what makes a moral claim one of right makes trouble for the pro-
posed use of the distinction between moral and legal rights. It follows from it that if 
there are any rights, there is a sense in which they already have the status of law: that 
is, they may legitimately be coercively enforced. This, after all, is why we think it can 
sometimes be morally legitimate for people to fight even their own governments for 
their freedom: because they have a coercively enforceable right to that freedom even 
if there is no positive law upholding it. On this view, natural right is underwritten by 
“natural law.” So the state cannot be seen as making it possible to coercively enforce 
a claim that is already there, since the claim was not only already there, but already 
coercively enforceable too.
Now this may not seem like a big problem. For of course there is still a question 
about the relation between law in this natural sense and the positive statutes that are 
actually passed by some political society. So why shouldn’t we say that a state that 
makes a law establishing a right is simply acknowledging a natural right that is already 
there, by making its own laws match the natural laws?
But there’s a problem with this too, which was brought out first by Thomas 
Hobbes, and then, following him, Kant. They pointed out that there is a sense in 
which rights do not exist even morally until laws upholding them are enacted by po-
litical society. After all, to say that you have a moral claim of right is not only to imply 
that you are entitled to defend your claim with force. It is also to imply that people 
have a moral obligation to respect your claim. But Kant and Hobbes argued that no 
one can be morally obligated to respect my rights until he has some guarantee that 
I will respect his rights. For if I force you to respect my rights without giving you a 
guarantee that I will respect yours, then I am putting you in a position where you 
are subject to my will and so are unfree. As Hobbes put it, a person who respects 
the rights of others when they do not respect his “would but make himself a prey to 
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others, and procure his own ruin.” Kant agrees: “No one is bound to refrain from 
encroaching on what another possesses if the other gives him no equal assurance that 
he will observe the same restraint towards him.” (Hobbes 1994, Part 1, chapter 15, p. 9. 
Kant 1996, 6:307). Hobbes and Kant argued that it follows that no one has a duty to 
respect anyone’s rights until some mechanism of enforcing everyone’s rights is in place. 
Since a right implies a duty on the part of others to uphold that right, and others 
cannot have that duty unless their rights are upheld as well, rights occupy what we 
might call interpersonal space—my rights and yours can only be realized together. 
Notice that this explains one of the intuitions about rights that I mentioned earlier: 
that there is something essentially reciprocal about rights. Rights are reciprocal in 
the sense that the full realization of my rights depends upon the full realization of the 
rights of others. It follows that whenever you claim a right, you commit yourself to 
respecting the rights of others.
Kant argued that it is only the political state that can provide guarantees of the 
enforcement of everyone’s rights. So if I say, “I have a right to X,” I make a demand on 
others that I am not in a position to make unless we live together in a political state: 
claims of right presuppose the existence of the political state, that is, it presupposes 
our membership in a collective body committed to upholding the rights of all. Claims 
of right presuppose this even if we are in a pre-political “state of nature” and the po-
litical state exists only in idea. So when I claim a right in the state of nature, I commit 
myself to supporting the existence of a political state. According to Kant, this means 
that we have a duty to live in the political state. Our rights in the state of nature, are, 
as Kant put it, “provisional.” They exist in the sense that we have the right to defend 
them, but not in the sense that anyone else has a duty to respect them. It is only when 
the state is actually formed that they become, again as Kant put it, “conclusive.”
Kant’s distinction between provisional and conclusive rights explains the 
status of natural rights better than distinction between moral and legal rights does. 
Provisional rights are in one sense already “legal” rights, since the right-holder is 
morally entitled to coercively enforce them. In another sense, however, they are not 
yet quite moral rights, since no one else is obligated to respect them. What society 
does when it legalizes a right is neither to grant the right holder something that is 
already his own and not society’s to give, nor to acknowledge a merely moral right 
that is already there by making it enforceable. What society does instead is to realize 
a right whose existence is essentially incomplete or imperfect in the state of nature.
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4. PERFECT AND IMPERFECT DUTIES
With that conception of natural rights in view, I now want to return to the ques-
tion of what our obligations to the other animals are. What exactly is the difference 
between saying that human beings owe a moral duty of humanity or kindness to the 
other animals, and saying that animals have a right—that is to say, a natural right, 
in the sense I have just defined—to be treated in ways that are consistent with their 
good? The tradition of moral philosophy supplies us with one fairly standard way of 
thinking about this difference: in terms of the distinction between perfect and imper-
fect duties. As the distinction is normally understood, it goes something like this: A 
perfect duty is a duty to do some particular action. It is what is nowadays called a di-
rected duty, meaning that it is owed to someone in particular, someone who is wronged 
by its omission. A standard example of a perfect duty is the kind of obligation we 
incur through an act of our own, like making a promise. If I make you a promise, I owe 
you the act I promised to perform, and I wrong you if I fail to perform it. The duties 
of justice are generally considered perfect duties. Here what is owed is often omission 
rather than action. If you violate one of my rights, you have wronged me by perform-
ing that act, which you ought to have omitted.
We have an imperfect duty, on the other hand, when we are obligated to do some 
general kind of action, but the duty is not specific about exactly which actions we 
should do, and it is not owed to anyone in particular. Many of us think of our duties 
of charity as taking roughly this form. We ought, we feel, to do something for those 
who are less well off than ourselves, but it is entirely up to us what form the giving 
takes and exactly to whom we will give. You can give volunteer time if you do not 
have much money, or money if you do not have much time. You can give to Oxfam 
or the Red Cross or you can micro-finance would-be entrepreneurs in third world 
countries. Or you can give spare change to homeless people sleeping in doorways 
on the street. For that matter you can give your spare change to one such person and 
give nothing to the next. All of that is entirely up to you. But no homeless person or 
charitable organization has a particular claim on you. No such individual is entitled 
to feel wronged or to drag you to court if you choose not to give to him. Imperfect 
duties, in short, do not correspond to rights.
The picture that results is a familiar one. There is a realm of justice in which 
we can make claims on one another. If those claims are not met, someone has been 
wronged. The duties of justice serve mainly to protect our freedom or autonomy and 
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the rights in which it is embodied. But a good person, a well-motivated person, will 
go beyond meeting the demands of justice. She will want to promote the good of 
others as well as to respect their rights, and so will engage in acts of charity, kindness, 
and beneficence. These actions cannot be required of us by law, but a good person 
will want to do them. It is into this category, according to this traditional story, that 
the morality of both kindness to animals and of charity to strangers falls.3 This is the 
picture I wish to challenge.
5. IMPERFECT DUTIES VS. IMPERFECT RIGHTS
Nowadays many people would call this story into question. One worry concerns 
the duties of rescue. If you are driving down a deserted road and encounter someone 
who has been injured in a car accident, your duty to help him seems to be a duty of 
beneficence. You are concerned with promoting his good, not with protecting his 
freedom. But you do not seem to have the discretion supposedly associated with the 
imperfect duties of beneficence. You cannot just choose either to help or not as you 
please in the way you can (supposedly) choose to give money to a particular home-
less person on the street or not as you please. Of course if stopping would put you 
in some sort of danger, or if you are even now rushing someone else to the hospital, 
then we might think you do nothing wrong in not stopping to help. But short of that, 
it seems as if you owe it to the injured person to stop, and as if you have wronged him 
if you just drive on by. So there seems to be a required action and a specific person 
who will be wronged if you do not perform it—the characteristics of a perfect duty.
We might try to argue that the duties of rescue, unlike ordinary duties of charity, 
simply are perfect duties. But Peter Singer has famously argued that our duties of 
charity to distant strangers often have the same features as the duties of rescue 
(Singer 1972 and 1997). There are people in third world countries in conditions of 
famine or extreme poverty who are dying right now. Assuming that there is simply 
not enough charity already on offer to cover all the need, a small donation, not costly 
to you, could make the difference of life and death to one of these people. It is not 
clear which one, of course, so there is no particular person who can accuse you of 
wronging him if you do not make the donation. In that respect, the duty looks imper-
3.  You might think that the duty of kindness to animals doesn’t fit the category of imperfect duty 
because cruelty to an animal plainly wrongs that animal. But this ignores the fact that on this tradi-
tional conception, hurting or killing an animal just isn’t counted as cruelty in the sense that violates 
duty if people deem it “necessary.” 
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fect. But in other ways, it looks just like the more local case of rescue—someone will 
die or be harmed if you do not act—and that seems to make it a perfect duty.
This suggests that there is something wrong with the distinction between perfect 
and imperfect duties. Imagine a reasonably affluent society in which most people are 
entirely well motivated—good, genuinely charitable people. If it were really true that 
it is entirely a matter of discretion to whom each person gives, and exactly when and 
how, then someone could starve or die of an injury in their midst, without anyone 
doing anything wrong, simply because no one happened to choose him as the object 
of their charity.
Faced with this sort of problem, I think we should take a look at a different pos-
sible way of understanding the duties of beneficence—not in terms of the idea that 
benefactors have an imperfect duty, but in terms of the idea that those in need of aid 
have an imperfect right. The early modern philosophers who introduced these cat-
egories into our moral thinking often write as if an imperfect right were just the right 
correlative to an imperfect duty. But in fact it matters which of these ideas we take to 
come first.
Suppose we take the fundamental moral fact here to be that each of us, individu-
ally, has an imperfect duty to help others. It is not owed to anyone in particular. Is it 
owed to anyone at all? There seem to be two possible answers. First, it is not owed to 
anyone, but is an undirected duty. Or perhaps it is owed in some vague way to “the 
needy.” Apparently, then, it is the needy, taken collectively, who hold the correlative 
imperfect right, and the needy, taken collectively, who are wronged if it is not met. 
Either way, the analysis seems inadequate to the case: it is individuals, not just this 
group, who are wronged if their need is ignored.
But suppose instead that we take the fundamental moral fact to be that of an 
imperfect right. Then we can say that every person has a right to, say, adequate suste-
nance, and to care when sick or injured. But the right is “imperfect” because it is not 
clear who among us owes it to him, or exactly how the need is to be met. Who then 
holds the correlative imperfect duty? The parallel answer is that it is all of us— the 
members of the group taken collectively—who have a duty to ensure that everyone 
among us gets help when he is in need.
I am not the first to point out that assigning the duty of aid collectively to a group 
explains some other intuitions that many of us have about this kind of duty (Murphy 
2000). In particular, it explains the intuition that for each of us who does have enough 
to help others, there is something like a “fair share” of charitable contributions, a 
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proportion of the total need that she should be expected to meet, given her level of 
wealth and income. If others in the group do not give their fair share and you do, 
then not only those who remain in need but you also are in a sense wronged by them. 
It also implies that the duty of each of us is not, at least in the first instance, to give 
enough to charity to support all of the unmet need that we possibly can. Instead, our 
most immediate individual duty is to try to organize the group in such a way that all 
unmet need will be met. Speaking roughly, this means that taking political action to 
realize better conditions, where possible, may be just as good as or better than trying 
to solve the problem of unmet need through extensive charitable giving.
I believe that the idea that each of us has an imperfect right to aid, should we 
come to need it, makes much better sense than the idea that each of us has an im-
perfect duty to give such care to some unspecified people. It implies that if people 
among us suffer or perish for want of aid, those individuals have been wronged. The 
“imperfection” of the right rests in the fact that it is hard to pick out any particular 
individual who is responsible for the wrong or for correcting it. But it seems perfectly 
reasonable to say that society, or humanity taken collectively, has failed to uphold the 
right of this needy person to assistance, and so has done wrong.
That is, it seems reasonable to say this if is possible to have a right as against a 
group or collective in the first instance, a right that does not arise from one’s rights 
against the individuals in the group. We can only have a right against a collective if 
the collective can have the correlative duty. So before we can ask whether there really 
is an imperfect right to aid we must address some questions about how a collective 
can have a duty.
6. CLAIMS OF RIGHT AGAINST COLLECTIVES
For some entity to have a duty—to be required to do something—that entity 
must be an agent. On most accounts of morality, and certainly on Kant’s, it must 
be a rational agent, one who is capable of thinking and making decisions based on 
reasons. In particular, the rational agent must be capable of recognizing that it has 
duties and responding to the fact that by doing them. How can a collective or group 
of people have a duty, on this account?
Like many philosophers, I think there is no problem in recognizing that groups of 
people can form collective agents in this way. Groups can think when their members 
can think, and when they can also talk and debate, which amounts to thinking to-
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gether. They can act—not just individually but as a group—when they have pro-
cedures for making and enacting decisions that makes those decisions and actions 
count as the decisions and actions of the group. Political states are collective agents 
in exactly that sense. A political state thinks through the thoughts of its citizens and 
legislators when they debate public issues, makes its decisions by voting and passing 
laws, and enacts its decisions by enforcing those laws. The enforcement of the law 
counts as the action of the state. It also acts as a collective agent when its duly elected 
representatives, or otherwise legitimate leaders, perform actions in their official roles 
that the laws entitle them to do. That’s what happens when one country declares war 
on another, for instance. That is something that the country, considered as a collec-
tive agent, does. 
So it is possible for a group to hold a duty corresponding to a right. But of course, 
humanity, taken collectively, is not at present such an organized group. We have no 
mechanism for making decisions that makes those decisions count as the decisions 
of humanity, collectively speaking. But Kant’s conception of natural right shows us 
that a right can exist provisionally against a group that as yet exists only in idea, so 
long as the group is one to whose existence those who claim the rights are commit-
ted. Suppose all human beings must claim rights, perhaps including rights to enough 
of the world’s resources to survive in reasonable conditions. And suppose that, as 
Kant thinks, this commits each of us to the existence of a collective body dedicated 
to upholding the rights of everyone. Then that collective body, by virtue of the com-
mitments of its own members, exists provisionally itself. In that case it is possible for 
individuals to have an imperfect right against that collective body itself. So we each 
could have an imperfect right to aid, owed to us by humanity collectively speaking.
But do we? In the next few sections I will argue that we once we understand the 
implications of the grounds of property rights, at least as Kant understands them, we 
will see why we cannot have rights to our own property without also having a duty to 
share it with others when they are in need.
7. THE GROUND OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
Kant, as I mentioned earlier, thought that the function of rights is to protect 
the freedom of everyone, and he thinks freedom itself is something to which every 
individual has a right. Among the rights he thought necessary for the protection of 
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freedom is the right to claim things as our property: we can claim bits of the land and 
its products as our own. His argument for this comes in steps.
First, imagine you are living in the state of nature and you pick an apple off an 
unowned tree. If anyone attempted to prevent you from doing this, he would have to 
interfere with you physically—grab you by the wrist, perhaps, and tear the apple from 
your hand. This would be inconsistent with your freedom—he would be using force 
to try to prevent you from acting, and you would therefore have the right to resist. 
You would be hindering a hindrance to your freedom. It follows that you have a right 
to eat the unowned apple, to make it your own by consuming it, simply because no 
one has a right to prevent you from doing so.
But that only shows we have a right to otherwise unowned things when they are 
in our physical possession. Kant thought that it must also be possible to have rights 
to objects even when they are not in our physical possession—that is, to own them. If 
it were not possible to do that, we could not make free and effective use of any natural 
resources that we cannot immediately consume or keep at all times in our physical 
control. The point is perhaps most obvious when we think about the use of the land, 
the primary object of “property” in Kant’s theory. I cannot grow beans on a piece of 
land if you are free to rip them out and plant wheat there whenever I am not actually 
in physical control of the land we both wish to use. So without property rights, we 
could not use natural resources effectively without being subject to the wills of others 
who might compete with us for the use of those resources. In effect it would render 
the use of natural resources for anything except immediate consumption impossible. 
Kant thought this would be inconsistent with our freedom. Therefore Kant conclud-
ed that we must all agree that it is possible for an individual to claim ownership in 
the land and its products, where ownership is a normative relation that goes beyond 
physical possession. It is a right, a kind of extension of our original right to freedom 
( Kant 1996, 6:246-255).
As we saw in section three, however, so long as we remain in the state of nature, 
these rights are necessarily “provisional.” They cannot be made “conclusive” until 
we come together into a political state, which will guarantee that the rights of all are 
upheld. This would be true as a conceptual matter even if the natural world offered 
itself to us in neatly bundled lots with fences already around them, but of course it 
strengthens the argument when we recall that there will always be disputes about 
the exact contours of our rights. Do the oranges falling from your tree into my yard 
belong to you or to me? May I put on a dam on the river as it flows through my land 
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without regard for the effects on the water supply when the river reaches you? Such 
disputes can only be settled legitimately by laws we make together; otherwise one of 
us will be unilaterally imposing his will on the other: our relations will be relations of 
power rather than right. 
Kant took the argument to imply that those who live on adjacent territory have 
a duty to organize themselves into a political state. It is people who live in proxim-
ity who make claims of right against each other, and who therefore form the group 
against whom an individual right is held. In more modern terms, participation in a 
shared economic system may be a more relevant form of proximity than shared terri-
tory. But Kant was also keenly aware that ultimately, all territory is adjacent, and that 
applies to economic systems as well. The Earth is round, as Kant liked to emphasize, 
and human technology conquers the mountains and the deserts and the sea, break-
ing down the barriers between us (Kant 1996, 6:311, 6:262). So, ultimately, a claim of 
property right is a claim against everyone else who can claim rights: a claim at least 
against every other human being. And that means that ultimately, whenever we claim 
a right, we presuppose the organization of the whole human race into an organized 
body dedicated to upholding and protecting the rights of everyone, and commit our-
selves to membership in that group.4
8. COMMON POSSESSION AND THE 
RIGHT TO BE WHERE YOU ARE
Before I can explain why this leads to an imperfect right to aid, it will be useful 
to revert to the question of animals for a moment. I have explained why Kant thinks 
it must be possible for us to acquire rights in the land and its products—why we must 
be able to own property. In the past, philosophers have taken this kind of story also to 
show that we are able to claim the other animals as property. But why exactly should 
that be? 
In the traditional doctrines of rights developed in the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries, especially in the theory of John Locke, it is perfectly clear what 
makes it possible for people to claim property in the other animals. It is a view, 
4.  What I’ve just said may seem to imply that everyone who claims a right is committed to the ex-
istence of a world government. I think that it does imply that, but Kant, notoriously, held back from 
drawing that conclusion, for reasons that are not perfectly clear. He did, however, think that claims 
of right commit us to membership in some sort of collective body dedicated to upholding the rights 
of everyone—he thought it could be something like a non-coercive League of Nations. I leave the 
question to what sort of collective exactly we are committed to one side here. 
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derived from Genesis, to the effect that God gave the Earth and everything that is in 
it to humanity to hold in common, explicitly including the animals (Locke 1980, p. 18; 
Genesis 1:29-30 and 9:3). Each of us can claim parts of this commonly held possession, 
provided that he does so in a way that respects the fact that the whole is owned or 
possessed in common with others. Locke thought that when you take property from 
the commons, you have to leave “enough and as good for others.” (Locke 1980, p. 21). 
Kant, as we have seen, thought that when you claim rights to property, you commit 
yourself to upholding the rights of others. Both insisted that the assumption that 
human beings hold the world in common plays an essential role in their explanations 
of why we can have rights to property. The role of the assumption is to answer an 
obvious question: How could human agreements to divide the Earth up into objects 
of private property be legitimate, if we had no right to the Earth in the first place?
But rather than grounding the idea of common ownership in revelation, Kant 
characterizes it as an idea that we necessarily presuppose when we claim our rights. 
He describes it, rather surprisingly, as the right of every human being to be where he or 
she is. He says (1996, 6:262):
All human beings are originally…in a possession of land that is in conformity with 
right, that is, they have a right to be wherever nature or chance…has placed them. 
...The possession by all human beings on the Earth which precedes any act of theirs 
that would establish rights…is an original possession in common…, the concept 
of which is not empirical…Original possession is, rather, a practical rational concept 
which contains a priori the…only principle in accordance with which people can 
rightly use a place on the Earth. 
Whenever we claim a right to the land or its resources, as individuals, we presup-
pose that humanity in general is in rightful possession of the Earth. We have to pre-
suppose it, because if we lacked this right, our right to freedom would be pointless, 
since it would not include a right to use any of the resources of action. There would 
be nowhere we had a right to go and nothing we had a right to use or consume. What 
makes humanity the group that holds the right to the Earth, according to Kant, is that 
each human being has a right to be “wherever nature or chance has placed them.”
The argument for this last point can be reconstructed in a way that brings out a 
parallel with the argument by which Kant shows we may claim ownership in previ-
ously unowned consumable goods. Prior to any individual claims of right, you are 
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not doing anything wrong just by being here—you are not, so to speak, trespassing. 
It follows that if someone attempted to use coercion to remove you, he would be 
wronging you, by violating your freedom. Just as you have the right to resist someone 
who tries to snatch the apple from your hand as long as it has no individual owner, 
you have the right to resist someone who tries to remove you from a place on the 
Earth so long as that place has no individual owner. And it follows from that that 
you have a right to be here. Every human being has the right to freedom, and so every 
human being must be regarded as one of the group whose rights you must acknowl-
edge when you claim your own rights. You claim to be part of this group simply 
because you are here, and so must accord that standing to others who are here as 
well. Characterizing this most basic of all rights as a right to be where you are gives us 
a pleasingly literal way of interpreting the idea of moral standing: if you find yourself 
standing somewhere on the planet, then you are a being who can claim rights in the 
land and its resources.
9. THE MEANING OF COMMON OWNERSHIP
The idea that we originally owned the world in common may sound fanciful 
without its theological grounding, but I think there is a way of thinking of it that 
brings out an important point. Obviously, the world is not literally owned by anyone, 
individually or in common, until human beings come along and set up our systems 
of property. So prior to any system of rights there would be nothing wrong in my 
establishing myself on some piece of land and defending it against all comers: that is, 
I would not be violating anyone else’s rights in doing so. But if I am to think of this 
act as establishing that I have a right against all comers, as something that they have 
an obligation to respect, then more is needed. Or to put the same point another way, 
if I am to conceive of my relations with others in moral terms, in terms of right and 
wrong, and not merely in terms of power—then more is needed. For whenever I claim 
a right, as we have seen, I presuppose the idea of humanity as an organized body com-
mitted to enforcing the rights of all the inhabitants of the Earth. And if humanity did 
form such an organized body, then we would all have to agree, through our legislative 
process, about who had a right to what: about how we are going to divide things out (I 
will say more in defense of this claim in the next section). And—finally now to come 
to the point about the right to aid—we would not all agree to a division of things that 
effectively denies someone the resources he needs in order to live. That, after all, 
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would amount to evicting him from the planet, as if he had no right to be here. So my 
rights are by their very nature limited to a reasonable share of the Earth’s resources. 
They are limited for the simple reason that others also have a right to a reasonable 
share.
That means that if property is now divided up in such a way that some of us can 
only live because of the charity of others, then there must be injustice in the situa-
tion, even if no one has done anything wrong to bring the injustice about. Although 
in the Groundwork Kant categorizes beneficence as an imperfect duty, elsewhere he 
puts forward exactly this way of looking at it. In the Metaphysics of Morals, after de-
scribing the duty of beneficence, he remarks:
Having the resources to practice such beneficence as depends on the goods of fortune 
is, for the most part, a result of certain human beings being favored through the 
injustice of the government, which introduces an inequality of wealth that makes 
others need their beneficence. Under such circumstances, does a rich man’s help 
to the needy, on which he so readily prides himself as something meritorious, really 
deserve to be called beneficence at all? (Kant 1996, 6:454).
In his course lectures Kant was even more forthright:
One may take a share in the general injustice, even though one does nobody any 
wrong by civil laws and practices. So if we now do a kindness to an unfortunate, we 
have not made a free gift to him, but repaid him what we were helping to take away 
through a general injustice. For if none might appropriate more of this world’s goods 
than his neighbour, there would be no rich folk, but also no poor. Thus even acts of 
kindness are acts of duty and indebtedness, arising from the rights of others (Kant 
1997, 27:416).
Kant’s point here is that if some people are rich enough to give and some so poor 
that they need to be given to, then there must already be injustice, even if it is not the 
result of any particular individual doing anything wrong. The world is not divided up 
into shares of resources in the way it would be if humanity were actually organized 
into a group and deciding on this division together. This need not be anyone’s fault: 
it is the result of the historical development of economic conditions over a period 
of time when no one (no representative of humanity collectively) was in charge of 
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world’s economy as a whole. It was no one’s job to make sure that things did not work 
out so that some people are rich and others poor, especially across national borders. 
Indeed, this kind of story illustrates why there should be such a thing as an “imper-
fect” right. There are imperfect rights because there are provisional rights which have 
not yet been made conclusive, even if this is through nobody’s fault.
It is important to see that there is injustice here, not just an unfortunate situ-
ation. In the first of the two passages I just quoted, Kant draws our attention to the 
fact that this kind of inequality makes the poor need the charity of the rich. Plainly, 
if someone else is in a position to determine whether you are able, say, to get enough 
to eat or not, through discretionary acts of his own, then you are subject to that per-
son’s will. And that means that by Kant’s criterion, you are not free. The traditional 
picture’s distinction between a realm of justice concerned with the protection of 
freedom and a realm of beneficence concerned with the promotion of the good does 
not hold up. Without rights to a fair share of the world’s resources, the poor are a 
subject population. They are subject to the wills of the rich. So, as Kant urges here, 
we should regard giving aid not as a discretionary act of virtue, but as the correction 
of a wrong—as justice rather than as charity.
Following Kant, I have argued that the world’s needy have an imperfect right to 
the aid they need to live in reasonable conditions. This right is a provisional right, 
held most immediately against those on adjacent territory or in a shared economic 
system, but ultimately against humanity collectively speaking. Correlative to this 
right is a duty of humanity collectively speaking to provide the needed assistance. 
The right is imperfect in the sense that it is unclear who exactly should provide the 
assistance. Yet we have a duty to make this right perfect, by organizing ourselves in 
such a way that the need will be met, for example, by collecting taxes to be used in 
support of the poor. We have this duty because such an organization is presupposed 
by our own claims of right. So here we have a right with a particular structure: an im-
perfect right held as against humanity collectively speaking. That, I will argue is the 
kind of right that the other animals have against us.
9. TWO CONSEQUENCES OF RIGHTFUL OWNERSHIP
Before I can explain why a similar argument shows that the other animals have 
rights against humanity, I must make explicit something that I have already assumed 
in making the argument above. In making his argument for property rights, Kant em-
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phasizes one consequence of legitimate possession: when you are in legitimate pos-
session of something, anyone who uses it without your permission wrongs you. But it 
is a more general consequence of the legitimate possession of a piece of territory that 
you are the one who determines what may and may not happen there: in other words, 
you may make the laws for a territory that is yours.
Earlier I argued that when we claim a right, we claim to be acting in the name 
of a political state dedicated to upholding the rights of everyone. The result of prop-
erty rights having these two aspects—a right to the use of the territory and a right to 
determine what happens on it—is that the sovereign of the political state functions 
both as the legitimate ruler, and as what Kant calls “supreme proprietor” of the land. 
As such, the sovereign has the right both to levy taxes and to make laws that apply 
to the territory in general. This view has consequences both for the way we think of 
welfare rights and the way we think of the right to a vote, or more generally to a say 
in what happens.
First, consider welfare rights. Kant claims that, on his conception, “the deter-
mination of the particular property of each is in accordance with the …principle of 
division, instead of with principles of aggregation.” (Kant 1996, 6:323-324). In other 
words, it remains true within a particular state (and not just of the Earth originally) 
that the land is regarded as held collectively by citizens, and divided out by the sover-
eign among the people for their use. What Kant means when he speaks of “division” 
rather than “aggregation,” is that the social contract should not be conceived as made 
by people each of whom brings his private land into the state with him, and with the 
land then being aggregated into the nation’s territory, as Locke sometimes suggests 
(Locke 1980, Chapter IX, section 120, p. 64). Rather, from the start the territory is seen 
as possessed in common by all the citizens, and divided out among individuals by the 
sovereign. Indeed, Kant tells us that:
…the real definition [of a right] would go like this: a right to a thing is a right to the 
private use of a thing of which I am in (original or instituted) possession in common 
with others…Hence, speaking strictly and literally, there is also no (direct) right to 
a thing. What is called a right to a thing is only that right someone has against a 
person who is in possession of it in common with all others (in the civil condition) 
(Kant 1996, 5:261).
This means that no individual really owns the land (or the means of production 
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more generally), a permanent thing which belongs to the people of the state collec-
tively, and more broadly to humanity. Instead private “owners” have a sort of life 
interest in such property.
This is one of the main reasons why, despite his emphasis on freedom and 
private ownership, Kant is no libertarian. Indeed the very first conclusion he draws 
from the fact that the sovereign must be regarded as the supreme proprietor of the 
land is that the government has the right to tax the people for the support of the poor 
(Kant 1996, 6:325-327).
Now consider the right to a vote. If the right to territory includes a right to de-
termine what may or may not happen on it, and we all own the territory in common, 
then we all share the right to determine its laws. This grounds something like a right 
to democracy, a right to a vote about what the laws of the state will be. To be one 
of the possessors of the world is to be legislative for it, to have a right to a share of 
control in what happens in it. This aspect of rights matters when we turn to the ques-
tion of the rights of animals, because human beings have taken complete control over 
the world that we share with them, and their fate is determined, to varying degrees, 
by our laws.
10. THE RIGHTS OF ANIMALS AGAINST HUMANITY
I have argued that, on Kant’s view, making a claim of right commits you to the 
endorsement of humanity as a collective agent, a body committed to upholding the 
rights of everyone. If there were such an agent, the world’s resources would be divided 
out fairly—not necessarily equally, that would require further argument—but cer-
tainly in such a way that no one was dependent on the charity of others, and therefore 
subject to their individual wills. People therefore have an imperfect right, as against 
that collective body, to a sufficient share, and your duty to respect that right commits 
you to giving others aid when they are in need. This is a duty you have not simply 
as a particular individual, but as a representative of humanity collectively speaking. 
I have also claimed that people’s right to a share of the world’s resources includes a 
share in the determination of what happens in the world, a right to participate in the 
making of the laws that govern the world. I believe that, for similar reasons, animals 
have a right that we take into account their interests when we make our laws.
In Genesis, God gives the world to humanity, explicitly including the other 
animals as part of the gift. Early natural rights theorists like Locke believed that 
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shows that we can have individual rights over animals, as we can over the land and 
the objects that we own. But even if that argument were sufficient to show that we can 
have the right to do what we like with the animals, many of us believe that nobody 
gave the Earth to humanity, with or without the other animals; instead, we just took 
it. Our relation to the other animals as things stand now is not one of right; it is one 
of raw power, as Hume emphasized in the passage I quoted in section 2.2. But animals 
are not mere objects: animals, at least the ones I am concerned with here, are sentient 
beings with lives and interests of their own. So we should conceive our relationships 
to the other animals in moral terms, not merely in terms of power. We should see 
them as fellow creatures, not just as objects that may be owned. To conceive of our 
relation to animals in moral terms, however, is think of the other animals, like our-
selves, as having a right to be where they are—that is, as among those who are in 
rightful possession of the Earth. After all, if a human being’s claim to a rightful share 
of the resources of the earth and a share of control over what happens in the world 
is not grounded in revelation, then it is grounded, as Kant claims, simply in the fact 
that we are here, and are doing nothing wrong by being here. But that is true of the 
other animals as well. If we regard the other animals not merely as property, but as 
fellow creatures with a stake in what happens in this world, then their subjection to 
the human species raises issues of justice, not merely of kindness.
Someone might reply that in the Kantian story I am relying on here, all rights 
are ultimately grounded in a right to freedom, and that the other animals can have 
no such right, because they are not free in the relevant sense: they are governed by 
instinct. But at this point it is important to see that once we focus on the question of 
animals, two aspects of freedom that in the human case go together can come apart. 
The right to freedom, in Kant’s theory, involves having the right to act autonomous-
ly—in accordance with one’s own values—but it also involves having the right not 
to be subject to the wills of others. Each of us as an individual is, of course, subject 
to the collective will of the citizens of whatever political community we live in, and 
ultimately to the collective will of humanity, but our right to freedom includes the 
right not to be subject to the arbitrary will of other individuals and private organiza-
tions. Animals are not autonomous, in the Kantian sense, because they act according 
to their natures rather than their values, but they are agents, and they may certainly 
be subject to the private wills of others, and in particular, of course, to the wills of 
human beings. So even in Kant’s theory, issues about the other animals’ freedom—
and therefore issues of right and justice—can arise.
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Do animals have a right to that freedom? In spelling out his conception of right, 
Kant does not make it clear why he thinks that human beings have a right to their 
freedom, and there is room for controversy over the point. One possibility is that 
he intends to derive that right from the moral value he believes that autonomy gives 
human beings as ends in themselves. Elsewhere I have argued that on Kant’s concep-
tion, non-human animals must also be seen as ends in themselves, because they have 
a good of their own, and a kind of autonomy, because their instincts teach to act in 
ways that promote that good (Korsgaard 2018).5 On that conception, the argument 
would be that it is inconsistent with their status as ends in themselves to subject them 
to the wills of others if that means that those others may force them to act in ways 
that are contrary to their good. However, Kant seems to have believed that the argu-
ments in his account of right could be made independently of his moral theory, and 
it is possible to read him simply as working with a conception of where the burden 
of proof lies. On that showing, if a creature, human or animal, is a free agent, you 
may not subject him to your will unless you have the right to treat him as him your 
property. This is because unless you have that right, he is doing nothing wrong if he 
resists, and the fact that he is doing nothing wrong if he resists means that he has the 
right to resist. The burden of proof rests on the one who wants to treat another free 
agent as property. If we think of things that way, in the absence of something like the 
Genesis story, animals are not property by their nature, and have the same right to be 
free of arbitrary control as human beings have.
But now that human beings taken control of most of the world’s territory and 
undertaken to determine what can and cannot happen on it by making our laws, 
we, collectively speaking, have made animals subject to human wills. We have taken 
over the control of the animals themselves and of a world that is as much theirs as it 
is ours. This gives them a two-fold right against us. First, they should not be made 
subject to the arbitrary wills of individuals and private organizations, a right which 
is violated by their status as property; and second, their interests must be taken into 
account when we make our laws.
Of course that way of putting it brings out a difference: it can only be the inter-
ests of the other animals, not their wills, that help to determine what sorts of laws we 
should have. I have suggested that, as joint possessors of the world, human beings 
can claim a right to something like democratic government—a right to participate in 
making the laws that determine what will happen in the world, so far as what happens 
5.  For the view that animal action exhibits a kind of autonomy, see Korsgaard 2009, chapter 5. 
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is up to human beings. But we cannot form a collective agent or a democratic body 
that includes all of sentient life, and if we do presuppose such an collective, it can 
only be in idea. The other animals cannot join with us in setting up a set of rules to 
govern the world that we share with them. They cannot join with us in shared delib-
erations about these matters, or in making the laws that inevitably affect their own 
lives and welfare. Insofar as human beings govern the world, animals are necessarily a 
subject population. They are what Kant called “passive citizens,” citizens who cannot 
vote (Kant 1996, 6:314; see Korsgaard 2018, 125-126). The best we can do is try to repre-
sent their interests in making our laws.
Humanity—increasingly as time goes on—controls what happens on this 
planet, and the other animals, or at least some of the other animals, are—also increas-
ingly as time goes on—subject to our wills. Animals—maybe not all of the insects 
and certainly not all of the even tinier creatures that are everywhere around us—but 
middle-sized animals of the sort that are at stake in these discussions—have gradu-
ally become a subject population, dominated by the collective power of the human 
species. If we regard ourselves as making laws not merely about how we should treat 
the other animals, but on their behalf, because like us they are among the rightful 
inhabitants of the world, then they have a right that we should make laws that are 
consistent with what is good for them. They have that right for the same reason that 
each of us does, because they are here, and are doing nothing wrong by being here.
The rich control the resources of the planet that we ought to share with the 
poor, so at least until we have greater justice, we owe them aid as a matter of right. 
The more humanity becomes actually organized, and therefore actually able to take 
collective action, the more outrageous it becomes that we do not organize ourselves 
in such a way that this need is met. Humanity determines the fates of both individual 
people and individual animals through the laws we collectively make determining 
what individuals may do to one another. Unlike the power imbalance between the 
rich and the poor, the power imbalance between human beings and the other animals 
is not something that will ever go away. But to the extent that animals live under the 
control of human laws, they are owed the protection of human laws. Animals have 
a right to that protection, in the same way that the poor have a right to our aid. Both 
groups have a right to that protection because they are a population effectively sub-
jected to humanity’s collective control over the Earth.
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 11. REPLIES TO OBJECTIONS
At the beginning of this paper I described some of the objections that people 
make to the idea of animal rights: In conclusion, I will briefly sketch some responses 
to these worries that follow from the account I have defended. This will also give me 
an opportunity to bring out some of the implications of the view, although obviously 
that is a large and complex topic to which I cannot do justice here.
11.1. Animals are property, and property cannot have rights.
Animals are not things, and should not be property. They do not have to be, 
because we do not need to choose between treating them as property and treating 
them as persons. Since they are not autonomous, they do not have all the same rights 
as people, but that doesn’t mean that they have none. If private individuals and orga-
nizations are going to keep domestic animals as companions, make them work, and 
use their products, those individuals and organizations should serve as their guard-
ians, and be answerable to the law for their treatment. Obviously, which kinds of in-
teractions should be allowable should depend on what is compatible with their good, 
and this is a contested issue. Some people believe that death is not a bad thing for 
non-human animals, so long as they are treated humanely during their lives; to such 
people the idea that farmers might be the guardians of animals being raised for food 
will make more sense than it does to those of us who do not believe early death is 
consistent with an animal’s good.6 Wild animals and commensal animals who live 
in niches created by human beings and wild animals who live on territory owned by 
the state are currently regarded as the property of the state; instead, the state should 
be their guardians, at least to the extent the control of the state affects their lives. Of 
course there will still be hard questions when those animals become dangerous to 
human beings or in other ways impossible for us to live with. But once we realize that 
it is not true that only human beings have rights, we should not assume that human 
interests should always prevail in such conflicts.
11.2. Rights require a kind of reciprocity of which animals are incapable.
I have argued that the kind of reciprocity inherent in the idea of a right is this: 
6.  For further discussion see Korsgaard 2018, 4.3, pp. 59-67; and 12.3, pp. 220-226.
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natural rights are provisional, and can only be made “conclusive” together. For human 
beings, that means that when we claim a right, we commit ourselves to upholding the 
rights of others, including, when we can, the rights of the other animals.7 But we also 
commit ourselves to the existence of an organized body that will enforce the rights 
of all coercively. In understanding the implications of this for animal rights, it helps 
to know that Kant distinguished two kinds of obligation: ethical and juridical (Kant 
1996, 6:219). Ethical obligation is the obligation to be motivated by respect for the 
moral law in general and, in this area, by respect for the rights of others (Kant 1996, 
6:391). You are juridically obligated when you may legitimately be forced to conform 
to a law. Animals cannot be ethically obligated, but domestic animals at least can be 
juridically obligated, that is, forced to conform to human laws, even though punish-
ment for disobedience would be out of place. Domestic animals are in fact juridi-
cally obligated not to harm people or each other, or to keep away from areas where 
they would be dangerous to people or obstruct our projects, for example. Obviously, 
things are a trickier when we think of the commensal animals who live in the human 
world, and I will not try to take up that difficult topic here.8 In any case, if we respect-
ed the rights of animals, forcing them to conform to our laws and practices would be 
legitimate, and not, as it is now, an exercise of raw power.
11.3 The function of rights is to protect au-
tonomy, and animals are not autonomous.
It is true that animal rights of the sort I have envisioned are concerned with their 
good, not with protecting their liberty. I think it is important that we should preserve 
a category of rights that are specially concerned with the protection of human au-
tonomy, and these will only pertain to human beings. But as I have tried to bring out, 
there is nevertheless an issue about the freedom of animals, for even in Kant’s eyes 
freedom is not just the capacity to live autonomously, but the absence of domina-
tion by the arbitrary wills of others. And so long as animals do not have legal rights, 
the law fails to acknowledge their right not to be subject to the arbitrary wills of 
7.  Although I have argued for the Kantian conception of natural rights from the idea that rights 
are trumps, I do not assume that there can be no genuine conflicts of right once the rights of animals 
are recognized. For further discussion see Korsgaard 2018, chapters 10 and 12 generally, especially 
section 12.1. 
8.  Many proponents of animal rights believe that human beings should leave all wild animals 
alone. Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2011, argue forcefully this position ignores the case of commensal 
wild animals with whom we cannot help but interact. 
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people and organizations. Laws that are intended to protect animal welfare without 
acknowledging that the animals have a right not to be subjected to people’s arbitrary 
wills are inadequate because they are not answerable to any standard of natural right, 
and we therefore feel free to shape those laws to our own convenience. For example, 
the federal animal welfare act in the United States simply exempts laboratory rats 
and mice and farm animals from any protections. Laws designed to uphold the rights 
of animals could not, at least in principle, be arbitrary in this way.
11.4. The idea that animals have rights has counter-
intuitive implications about the actions of our ances-
tors and those now living in the developing world.
Cruelty to animals has always been wrong. But on the view I am proposing, the 
natural rights of animals against humanity collectively speaking arise from a circum-
stance that has developed gradually: the human takeover of the world. In my discus-
sion of the duty of aid, I have tried to emphasize that we can believe the failure to 
aid is a violation of right, without thinking that the gradual rise of global econom-
ic inequality is the fault of anyone in particular, because it dates from a time when 
no one was in charge of the economic arrangements of the world. Once we see the 
wrong, and we are more globally organized, and we have the institutions needed to 
address inequality, of course, things are different—then we are at fault if we do not. 
I think something similar is true in the case of our relations to animals. Certainly it 
is true of the loss of habitat for wild animals: the spread of the human population to 
nearly every part of the world happened gradually, and when no one was in charge 
of the division of the world, or ever thought about leaving space for wild animals. 
We could do something about it now, if it is not too late. 9 In a similar way, the prac-
tices of domestication arose from individuals and groups simply trying to cope with 
human necessities, at a time human beings were not sufficiently organized to find 
ways to protect animals while addressing those necessities. But at least in the devel-
oped world, this is no longer true. We can correct it now, without implying that our 
ancestors and those in less favorable conditions are at fault.
9.  In this essay I have argued that groups can have duties and individuals can have therefore rights 
against them, but I have not argued that groups can have rights and we can owe duties to them, as 
these remarks suggest. For further discussion see Korsgaard 2018, chapter 11.
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11.5. The idea that animals have rights has out-
rageous practical implications.
The rights that I have attempted to defend in this paper are rights that animals 
hold against humanity collectively, rights that arise from our collective control of 
their world. They are not rights that animals hold against each other, and do not 
imply that, for instance, a wildebeest has a right against a lion not to be eaten.10 I also 
believe that they are, as it were, proportioned to the kind of control that we exercise 
over the lives of animals. That kind of control is different in the case of those wild 
animals who live in “the wild,” or anyway away from human beings; the wild animals 
of commensal species who live with us, and domestic animals.11 I think their rights 
against us would be different accordingly, though in each case they have a right that 
we exercise that control as far as possible in ways that are consistent with what is 
good for them.
But unquestionably, acknowledging the rights of animals would have some con-
sequences that some would regard as outrageous. Some of our practices, certainly 
factory farming, and invasive scientific research on animals, cannot be regarded as 
anything but naked exercises of power and should be given up. My aim in this paper 
has not been to show that the idea of animal rights can be made uncontroversial. It 
has been to show that there is a philosophical basis in Kant’s theory of right for the 
idea. 
We may suppose that animals have rights against humanity for the same reason 
that the needy have claims to our aid: the world belongs to us all. To regard the in-
habitants of the Earth morally rather than in terms of power is to regard the Earth 
itself as the collective possession of all its inhabitants, who all have a right to share in 
its bounty and to a share in the determination of what happens, including who may 
do what to whom. In fact, whenever we ourselves make claims of individual claims of 
right, whenever we claim to live as we choose or do what we like with our own prop-
erty, we are asserting a right whose basis is simply that we find ourselves resident on 
10.  This does not settle the question whether the antelope might have a right against us that we 
should protect him from the lion, of course. For further discussion, although not, unfortunately, a 
settling of the question, see Korsgaard 2018, Chapter 10, and section 11.7. 
11.  Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011 argue that domestic animals should be citizens, that the status 
of what they call “liminal” animals—commensal wild animals who depend on human beings—is 
comparable to that of immigrants, and wild animals who live away from human beings are like the 
citizens of other nations. I think of animals simply as members of a population that has become sub-
jected to humanity, but I agree with them that the rights we hold against these groups are different. 
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the planet, and are doing nothing wrong by being here. So a commitment to dealing 
fairly with our fellow inhabitants of the planet is implicit in our claims.
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